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We investigated the distinction between traits (also labeled basic tendencies or dispositions) and 
(characteristic) adaptations, two related features of the personality system postulated to influence how 
personality manifests throughout the lifespan. Traits are alleged to be universal, causal, and enduring 
entities that exist across cultures and through evolutionary time, whereas learned adaptations are acquired 
through sustained interaction with cultural, physical, and social environments. Although this distinction 
is central to several personality theories, they provide few measurable criteria to distinguish between traits 
and adaptations. Moreover, little research has endeavored to operationalize it, let alone test it empirically. 
Drawing on insights from four frameworks—the Five-Factor Theory, Cybernetic Big Five Theory, 
Disposition-Adaptation-Environment Model, and New Big Five—we attempted to investigate the 
distinction both theoretically and empirically. Using various experimental rating conditions, we first 
scored 240 questionnaire items in their degrees of definitionally reflecting traits and/or adaptations. Next, 
we correlated these definitional ratings with the items’ estimates of rank-order stability, consensual 
validity, and heritability—criteria often associated with personality traits. We found some evidence that 
items rated as more trait-like and less adaptation-like correspond to higher cross-rater agreement and 
stability, but not heritability. These associations survived controlling for items’ re-test reliability, social 
desirability, and variance. The theoretical and empirical implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Traits and Adaptations: A theoretical examination and new empirical evidence 
Several prominent personality theories (e.g., McAdams & Pals, 2006; McCrae & Costa, 2008; 
DeYoung, 2015; Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018) rest on a distinction between two features of the 
personality system, which we refer to as traits (or basic tendencies, dispositions) and adaptations (or 
characteristic adaptations). Traits are considered abstract, causal, and enduring entities that exist across 
cultures and have emerged over evolutionary time in response to universal stimuli. Through sustained 
interaction with one’s particular cultural, physical, and social environment, they become expressed as 
adaptations—each individual’s unique psychological characteristics, ranging from goals and habits to the 
self-concept1. The trait-adaptation distinction mirrors the one between core and surface traits (Cattell, 
1946; but see Kandler, Zimmerman, & McAdams, 2014).  
At first glance, it provides an elegant way to reconcile observations of numerous highly universal 
features of personality variability—which point to its deep evolutionary (“biological”) roots (Allik, Realo, 
& McCrae, 2013)—with the inevitable context-specificity of how personality is expressed and measured: 
the former pertain to traits, the latter to adaptations. At a closer look, however, the distinction becomes 
less clear, because while theorists do provide lists of examples for each, they offer few well-defined and 
testable criteria for telling traits and adaptations apart; measurable criteria may exist for traits but less so 
for adaptations (cf. Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018). The paucity of such criteria complicates 
exploring the conceptual and practical value of the trait-adaptation distinction. Clarifying the distinction 
is therefore of utmost theoretical importance.  
 
1 Theories differ in what their proponents include among adaptations. For example, the Five-Factor Theory (McCrae & Costa, 2008) has a 
wide range of psychological characteristics categorized as adaptations, while the Cybernetic Big Five Theory (DeYoung, 2015) delineates 
only three categories of adaptations: goals, interpretations and strategies. 
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Moreover, recent findings show that hundreds of questionnaire items contain unique variance with 
properties typically associated with traits. These include 1) stability over more than a dozen years, 2) 
agreement across assessment methods, and 3) heritability (Mõttus, Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, & 
McCrae, 2017; Mõttus, Sinick et al., 2019), as well as 4) distinct developmental patterns (Mõttus & 
Rozgonjuk, in press) and 5) predictive validity (Seeboth & Mõttus, 2018). This has led some theorists to 
suggest that items represent both traits and adaptations at the same time (Costa & McCrae, 2017). While 
this may blur the line between them, it also offers an opportunity to operationalize and empirically explore 
the trait-adaptation distinction: plausibly, items can be quantified in the degrees to which they 
definitionally correspond to either type of construct, and these degrees can be linked with the empirical 
properties of the items such as their stability, cross-method agreement, and heritability. 
Traits 
Five-Factor Theory (FFT; McCrae & Costa, 2008), Cybernetic Big Five Theory (CB5T; DeYoung, 
2015) and frameworks such as the New Big Five (NB5; McAdams & Pals, 2006) or the Disposition-
Adaptation-Environment Model (DAE; Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018) differentiate latent, 
biologically-rooted, and humanly-universal personality traits (or basic tendencies, dispositions) from their 
more learned, culture-specific, and circumscribed manifestations—(characteristic) adaptations (CAs).  
Personality traits [or basic tendencies (BTs) in FFT and dispositions in DAE and NB5] are 
commonly defined as latent constructs that dispose an individual to consistent patterns of emotion, 
motivation, cognition, and behavior (McCrae & Sutin, 2018)—although conceptions of traits do vary 
within personality research2. An empirical hallmark feature of traits is that individual differences in them 
 
2 Depending on the model, traits can be conceptualized in a variety of ways: emergent from a series of mutually-reinforcing smaller traits, 
composites of their indicators, descriptive summaries of groups of related behaviors, or even simply ‘mathematical fictions’ (Revelle & 
Elleman, 2016). A full consideration of the ways that personality researchers conceive of traits is beyond the scope of this paper, but we 
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are stable over time (Funder, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 2008). Also, unless there are explicit reasons to 
believe otherwise, traits should generally be expressed in ways that are comparably detectable by different 
observational methods such as informant-ratings and self-reports, as otherwise their objective existence 
cannot be established (e.g., Funder, 1991; Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995). Of course, the criterion of 
cross-rater agreement suffers from the possible limitation that some personality characteristics may be 
inherently less visible to external raters than others because of their content (e.g., emotions rather than 
overt behavior), and this may in principle be confounded with their trait-ness—but we currently have few, 
if any, alternatives to assessing the method-independence of a wide spectrum of traits. 
Additionally, several theorists (e.g., Allport, 1931; McCrae & Costa, 2008) have proposed at least 
some genetic basis as a necessary cause of variation in traits, consistent with the notion that they are 
intrinsic to individuals rather than merely learned responses (but for a critique of this criterion see Johnson, 
Penke, & Spinath, 2011; Turkheimer, Pettersson, & Horn, 2014). Finally, cross-culturally universal 
properties of traits (e.g., associations with demographic factors such as age and gender) are also consistent 
with their relative independence from social and temporal context (Allik et al., 2013). 
Much of recent personality research has relied on the Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & John, 
1992) or the “Big Five” (Goldberg, 1990) domains of Neuroticism (or inversely, Emotional Stability), 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience (or Intellect), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The FFM 
domains show substantial rank-order stability over many years (Terracciano, Costa, & McCrae, 2006), 
cross-rater agreement (McCrae, Costa, et al., 2004), heritability (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014), and cross-
culturally universal age and gender differences (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). However, the Big Five 
 
note that distinguishing traits as basic tendencies from their characteristic adaptations generally assumes ascribing traits an underlying 
causal ontology. However, for a discussion of the ontological status of the ‘trait,’ see Mõttus (2016) and its subsequent responses.  
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domains do not exhaust the universe of personality traits. Most FFM traits are at least moderately 
correlated (van der Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010) and can therefore be collapsed into broader 
traits such as stability and plasticity (DeYoung, 2006). Likewise, there are subsets of more strongly 
correlated characteristics within each of the FFM traits, suggesting that they can be broken apart into 
narrower traits such as aspects (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) or facets (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
These narrower constructs also demonstrate the same empirical properties associated with higher-order 
traits (e.g., Jang et al., 1998; McCrae et al., 2005). Such a representation of personality as a system of 
increasingly narrow traits is called the personality trait hierarchy (Eysenck, 1991).  
The trait hierarchy can be extended even below facets. Recent research suggests that specific 
behavioral, cognitive and affective patterns operationalized with individual questionnaire items such as “I 
enjoy parties” or “I leave my belongings around” also display stability and cross-method agreement, and 
most of them also show distinct etiology in terms of heritable variance and disparate developmental 
patterns (Mõttus, McCrae, Allik, & Realo, 2014; Mõttus, Realo, Allik, Esko, Metspalu, & Johnson, 2015; 
Mõttus, Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, & McCrae, 2017; Mõttus & Rozgonjuk, in press). This applies even 
when variance due to higher-order traits (e.g., FFM domains, aspects, and facets) is removed from 
individual items, suggesting that they contain unique information about how individuals differ from each 
other in stable, observable and heritable ways. These findings as well as items’ associations with age and 
gender tend to replicate across samples from different countries (Mõttus, Sinick, et al., 2019). Items also 
offer incremental predictive value to a range of life outcomes over the Big Five for both broad and narrow 
criteria (Seeboth & Mõttus, 2018).  
Given that personality is most typically operationalized with questionnaires, items currently 
constitute the most high-resolution assessments of personality variance and thereby the most specific 
measurable personality traits. Narrow personality traits currently often captured by single personality test 
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items have been called nuances (McCrae, 2015). 
Adaptations 
According to the FFT, CAs represent concrete realizations of BTs that emerge via interaction with 
one’s environment across the lifespan (McCrae & Costa, 2008), in a process referred to as accommodation 
(McCrae & Sutin, 2018). In FFT, CAs include “habits, interests, values, skills, knowledge, beliefs, 
attitudes, and the internalized aspect of roles and relationships,” as well as the self-concept (p. 278; 
McCrae & Costa, 2008). The DAE model (Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018) describes adaptations 
similarly to FFT, but postulates that adaptations are mediators between specific traits (dispositions) and 
specific environmental experiences and can only be defined relative to them (i.e., adaptations do not exist 
independently of what they mediate). Similarly to FFT and DAE, the NB5 model (McAdams & Pals, 
2006) describes CAs as “motivational, social-cognitive, and developmental adaptations, contextualized in 
time, place, and/or social role” (p. 208), although it is less restrictive than FFT and DAE in allowing some 
CAs to develop independently of traits.  
In contrast to FFT and DAE and more similarly to NB5, CB5T (DeYoung, 2015) defines CAs as 
products of trait-environment interactions that can develop in part independently from their underlying 
traits—individuals can even adopt goals and strategies that run counter to their traits. However, the CB5T 
treatment of CAs is more restrictive than those of FFT, DAE and NB5 in that CAs are defined in relation 
to particular circumstances that are not present for all humans across time (DeYoung, 2015). In other 
words, any personality characteristic that is culturally unique or would not have existed in human 
evolutionary history does not meet CB5T’s criteria for trait-ness: it is an adaptation. All perspectives but 
FFT allow bidirectional associations between traits and adaptations; a distinctive feature of FFT is that 
basic tendencies are insulated from any external influence that does not directly involve altering brain 
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physiology.  
Distinguishing between traits and adaptations 
Though several of the discussed theories rest on the distinction, their proponents (e.g., DeYoung, 
2015; McCrae & Sutin, 2018; Asendoprf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018) explicitly recognize that distinguishing 
between traits and CAs is not straightforward. First, this is because each of the theories defines the 
constructs slightly differently. Second, this is because the measurements of traits and CAs are confounded: 
any trait measurement is based on 1) aggregating an individual’s adaptations, and/or 2) the individual’s 
assessments of their own traits (e.g., one-item trait scales), which relies on their self-concept that is 
considered a CA in most theories.  
Not surprisingly, then, only few studies to date have directly focused on disambiguating the 
distinction. Kandler and colleagues (2014) assessed empirical trait criteria such as heritability and stability 
in what were purportedly either more core (e.g., Big Five) or more surface characteristics (e.g., attitudes, 
interests, and goals)—that is, traits and CAs, respectively. They found that some empirical trait criteria 
(e.g., heritability) were more pronounced in core than surface characteristics, but on the whole, there were 
few systematic differences between the two kinds of constructs. This led Kandler and colleagues (2014) 
to call for a revision of the trait-CA distinction.  
In defense of FFT, McCrae and Sutin (2018) argued that these results are compatible with the 
theory: 
 “ ... the issue is not whether attitudes, values, and interests are core characteristics, but 
whether they are [traits] or [adaptations], and the answer to that depends entirely on how 
one looks at them. If one focuses on the concrete content of a need or interest or value, it 
is a[n adaptation]; if one focuses on the general tendency underlying the specific 
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instantiation, it is likely a [trait].” (p. 160) 
This is because according to the duality principle of the FFT, any given personality construct 
(measurement) does two things at the same time: on the one hand, it represents a concrete behavioral 
(broadly defined) manifestation and on the other, indexes an abstract, underlying trait (Costa & McCrae, 
2017). Intelligence offers a useful illustration of this principle. While a score on a vocabulary test indicates 
learned knowledge due to various environmental factors (years of education, number of books at home, 
being read to, happenstance), when combined with a variety of other indicators of cognitive skills, it 
simultaneously serves to indicate an underlying trait of intelligence. [Of note is that some authors object 
to the notion of underlying intelligence that exists independently of cognitive skills (Kievit, Hofman, & 
Nation, 2019).]  
If only broad aggregate constructs such as FFM domains or even their facets were to meet the 
empirical criteria for traits, distinguishing them from CAs would be considerably easier. Although 
individual CAs would be their context-specific indicators, the specifics of individual CAs would be 
filtered out in aggregation, in line with classical test theory. For example, although a CA itself, the item 
“I enjoy parties with lots of people” is an indicator of a facet (Gregariousness) and a domain (Extraversion), 
both defined as the common or compound (McCrae, 2015) variance of numerous indicators that represent 
these traits. Its CA-ness (reference to parties), thus, would “dissolve” in those higher-order trait scores. 
However, if the unique variance (above and beyond facets and domains) of such items has properties 
typically associated with traits, equating traits with higher-order constructs and CAs with the items used 
to define those constructs is problematic.  
According to FFT, the duality principle resolves this problem: every item assesses both a trait and 
a CA, simply depending on how one interprets it (McCrae & Sutin, 2018; see the quote above). FFT does, 
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however, distinguish between behavioral and global items. Behavioral items serve as trait indicators, 
assessing specific activities, interests, goals, and the like, whereas global items refer to broad, adjective-
based self-assessments of traits (e.g., “I am extraverted”). Although the latter seem to directly refer to 
traits and bypass CAs, any response is inherently based on one’s self-concept and the interpretation of the 
adjective, and both of these are CAs. FFT refers to this phenomenon as “duality once-removed” (p. 153, 
McCrae & Sutin, 2018). Regardless of content, each item is equally a trait and a CA, and attempts to 
distinguish between them are inherently flawed according to FFT.  
However, CB5T, NB5, and DAE see constructs as representing either a trait or an adaptation but 
not both at the same time. This makes exploring their differences a meaningful endeavor according to 
these theories. For example, DAE offers three specific criteria for separating them: “(i) the adaptation is 
co-influenced by both the disposition and the environment, (ii) the disposition influences the adaptation 
more strongly than vice versa, and (iii) the adaptation longitudinally mediates influences of the disposition 
on the environment or vice versa” (Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018, p. 169). These are useful and clear 
conceptual criteria for telling the two apart, although empirically distinguishing between them may be 
more complicated. Because adaptations are only defined relative to specific traits and experiences, and 
because there is potentially a large number of traits (e.g. nuances) and possibly even an even larger number 
of environmental experiences linked with these traits, identifying potential adaptations, operationalizing 
them independently from traits and experiences, and studying their empirical properties in longitudinal 
designs with appropriately-spaced measurement intervals would be a tall, albeit valuable, order. It may be 
important to acknowledge, however, that identifying the specific experiences causally linked with 
personality traits has proven far more difficult than most researchers expected (e.g., Denissen et al., 2019). 
The CB5T may offer a simpler solution for operationalizing the difference between traits and CAs: 
simply classifying constructs as either of them. Items, indexing the narrow traits of nuances, may be 
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particularly well-suited for this purpose. Their psychological meaning is laid bare without any filters, 
unlike that of aggregate constructs (e.g., facets or domains) for which item content and verbal 
label/summary may not entirely match. Also, items are numerous, providing more statistical power to 
study systematic quantitative variability among them (Mõttus & Rozgonjuk, in press). Indeed, as far as 
CB5T is concerned, questionnaire items can independently measure either traits or CAs: some items focus 
“on a particular adaptation, in all its cultural and personal specificity, whereas others ‘simply describe 
culturally universal traits’ ” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 41). While variance due to traits may be part of the 
variance in CAs empirically—because traits influence the adoption of the latter—the two are still 
conceptually distinct and can be classified as either by those familiar with their respective definitions. 
This study 
In an attempt to disambiguate the distinction at least to some extent, the current study aimed to 
characterize a number of questionnaire items in the degrees to which they reflected a trait and/or an 
adaptation. We capitalized on previous findings that many individual items reflect specific personality 
traits with unique empirical properties3, over and above the broader traits they were designed to measure 
(Mõttus, Sinick et al., 2019). Every single item can then indicate a BT (a higher-order BT or a narrow 
BT—nuance—specific to the particular item), a CA (revealing a trait only when aggregated with 
numerous other adaptations), or both at the same time. Because there are numerous items, we aimed to 
study systematic variations among them in these properties. 
Items were first definitionally characterized in their BT-ness or CA-ness by human raters. The 
 
3 Throughout this paper, we refer to two distinct definitions of “trait”: 1) broadly, a feature of a species that displays stability over time, 
cross-rater agreement, heritability, and cross-cultural validity; and 2) more specifically, one of two distinct categories of relatively stable 
psychological features utilized by personality theories (distinguished from “adaptations”). When discussing the ideas and findings 
pertaining specifically to our study, we henceforth use “BT” to denote the latter definition. 
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raters were assigned to different rating conditions that allowed items to be rated as corresponding to either 
a BT definition or a CA definition, or as simultaneously corresponding to both definitions. They were 
instructed based on BT and adaptation definitions that had been written to be consistent with the relevant 
major theories and had been discussed with the proponents of the theories4. Non-expert ratings were 
validated against those provided by the authors of the paper and two other researchers who have previously 
published on the topic. Next, the degrees to which items definitionally reflected BTs and/or CAs (i.e., 
their ratings) were compared with their rank-order stability, cross-rater agreement, and heritability— 
properties often associated with BTs (DeYoung, 2015; Kandler et al., 2014; McCrae & Costa, 2008).  
We controlled for three potential confounds of the associations: items’ social desirability, variance, 
and re-test reliability. Traits and items are known to vary in their extents of being socially desirable and it 
is possible that this item property systematically co-varies with other properties, both definitional and 
empirical; it is conceivable, for example, that traits per se are evaluatively more neutral than many of their 
associated adaptations. Likewise, items with greater variance are likely to have stronger empirical 
properties (co-variance depends on variance) and they may also vary in the degrees of appearing as traits; 
for example, social pressure on adaptations may constrain their variance. Finally, more reliably estimable 
traits may have stronger empirical trait properties and be more likely to appear as traits and/or adaptations 
definitionally—simply because they are easier to rate. 
Our explorations were based on “raw” (as-is) item scores, which contained variance from higher-
order traits as well as the nuance-specific variance uniquely associated with each item. Due to complexities 
associated with interpreting items’ unique variance (after having been residualized for facets and domains, 
 
4 We are grateful to Robert McCrae, Colin DeYoung, Christian Kandler, Jens Asendorpf and Jan-Erik Lönnqvist for their comments on the 
definitions.  
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as has been done before for other purposes; e.g., Seeboth & Mõttus, 2018; Mõttus et al., 2017, 2019; 
Mõttus & Rozgonjuk, in press) in this context, we ultimately chose not to correlate items’ BT-ness and 
CA-ness ratings with the stability, cross-rater agreement, and heritability of their unique variance. If all 
theories proposed a uni-directional relationship from traits to CAs, we could consider items’ residual 
variance a result of more specific traits, independent of higher-order factors, besides CAs (for an 
informative overview of parsing item variance, see McCrae, 2015). However, because multiple theories 
posit a back-channel by which CAs may modify traits, items’ residuals become more complicated to 
interpret (e.g., items could be partly residualized for the possible CA-to-trait effects of their own CA-ness).  
Possible predictions 
Given that both FFT and CB5T, in particular, rely on the distinction between BTs and CAs, we 
base possible predictions about it primarily on these theories (Table 1). While DAE does specify criteria 
to examine the distinction, the data we have opted to utilize would not meet the requirements set to 
distinguish them (see above): it would be difficult to assess environmental influences or longitudinal 
relationships between these and dispositions/adaptations using a sample of ratings of personality item 
content. 
At face value, different items do appear to assess universally-human and environmentally-adapted 
characteristics to different degrees (e.g., “I am a worrier” vs. “I love the excitement of roller coasters”), 
leading us to predict that they would vary in the extents of being rated as corresponding to a BT definition 
and/or a CA definition, and that different raters and rating conditions could yield roughly similar ratings. 
According to CB5T (and NB5 and DAE), items rated as more BT-like would likely be rated as less CA-
like: a negative correlation between items’ CA-ness and BT-ness ratings would be expected. The duality 
principle of FFT would predict limited variance in the degrees to which items reflect either BTs or CAs 
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and thus no correlation between the ratings of the two, except perhaps for when raters are explicitly asked 
to contrast them. 
By default, one could expect definitionally BT-like items to also display more of the empirical 
properties typically associated with traits—heritability, stability and cross-method agreement—than the 
CA-like items. What is definitionally a trait should also be empirically a trait, more so than what is 
definitionally not a trait. According to both CB5T and FFT, however, the expected pattern may not be as 
straightforward, and the proponents of both theories have reasons to distance themselves from such 
specific predictions. In fact, CB5T only explicitly mentions heritability in its section on distinguishing 
between BTs and CAs, instead preferring the sole criteria of 1) cross-cultural and 2) temporal universality 
to differentiate them. Regarding genetic influence, CB5T claims that CAs will only appear heritable due 
to variance they share with traits because, independently of BTs, they are learned responses (DeYoung, 
2015). In what complicates things, however, DeYoung (2015) adds: 
“In CB5T … all of the genetic variance in any characteristic adaptation is a function of 
related traits, so traits should mediate genetic effects on characteristic adaptations, and 
one might expect heritabilities to be lower for characteristic adaptations than for traits. In 
practice, however, it may be exceedingly difficult to identify (and to measure with sufficient 
accuracy) exactly the relevant set of traits that would account for the genetic variance of 
any given characteristic adaptation. Heritability studies, therefore, are unlikely to offer 
any guidance as to what is a trait versus a characteristic adaptation.” (p. 40) 
As neither stability nor cross-rater agreement are explicitly mentioned as criteria to distinguish 
between BTs and CAs, we derive our CB5T-based predictions of them from personal communications 
with its author in addition to reading of the theory itself (DeYoung, 2015). Thus, while these predictions 
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may not (yet) be explicitly stated by CB5T, they do reflect the current thinking of its author. Specifically, 
he postulates that “[CAs] must be stable over time, and given that they are reasonably stable, others are 
likely to know about them too, yielding inter-rater agreement” and therefore one “would not assume that 
CAs described in personality items are less heritable, stable, and agreed upon than [BTs], especially in 
adulthood” (C. G. DeYoung, personal communication, 13 December 2017). In fact, given that CAs are 
both 1) more specific than BTs and 2) may contrast with their underlying BTs, they may sometimes be 
even more observable to others than traits according to CB5T. While CB5T implies that BTs may be more 
stable than CAs (simply because BTs—as precursors to CAs—should last longer), its author also notes 
that “stability is not a criterion that can be used to differentiate [BTs] and CAs” (reviewer comment by C. 
G. DeYoung, Jan. 2019), as all CAs must be sufficiently stable to be “characteristic” of an individual 
(DeYoung, 2015).  
In summary, therefore, CB5T and its author provide no strong a priori reasons to expect 
correlations between definitional BT-ness on the one hand and stability, cross-rater agreement and 
heritability on the other. However, since BTs are (highly) stable and heritable, whereas only the part of 
CAs caused by BTs ought to be stable and heritable according to CB5T, stability and heritability could, 
on average, be smaller in more definitionally CA-like items; we explore these as ad hoc possibilities5. 
Likewise, “the most straightforward interpretation of FFT would predict that interests, attitudes, 
and goals [CAs] ought to be heritable only insofar as they are related to heritable traits” (McCrae & Sutin, 
2018, p. 159). That is, definitionally more CA-like items may or may not display heritability (no 
correlation). However, since FFT BTs are entirely heritable, and only the parts of CAs resulting from BTs 
 
5 Our ad hoc predictions are those to which the proponents of the respective theories may not necessarily subscribe to, but that seem worth 
exploring to us. 
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are heritable, the average heritability could be expected to be smaller in definitionally CA-like items 
according to FFT; we consider this as an ad hoc possibility (as with CB5T). FFT also holds that “stability 
is generally expected for [BTs], but it is not contraindicative for [CAs]” (p. 159, McCrae & Sutin, 2018); 
some CAs may be highly stable (e.g., speaking a language) whereas others (e.g., frequenting a young 
mothers’ club) may be of limited duration. Therefore, although definitionally CA-like items may often be 
as stable as BT-like items, on average they could be somewhat less stable; again, we explore this as an ad 
hoc possibility (as with CB5T). As FFT offers no specific prediction about cross-rater agreement, we 
predict no correlation between item’s BT- and CA-ratings and cross-rater correlations. Neither a priori 
nor ad hoc hypotheses based on any theory were preregistered. 
It is noteworthy that while these hypotheses were generated based on extensive consultation with 
the relevant literature and theorists, they are all essentially null hypotheses—neither theory predicts any 
clear differences between BTs and CAs in their associations with empirical criteria. Specifically, we 
started the project with stronger hypotheses that seemed plausible at face value; after consulting with 
theorists and receiving detailed and constructive reviews on the original submission of the article, we only 
list some possible predictions that we derived from FFT and CB5T ad hoc. We thus emphasize that this 
study is an exploratory investigation of a theoretically very complicated yet extremely fundamental issue 
in personality science. Our (mostly null) predictions for definitionally and empirically distinguishing 
between BTs and CAs are preliminary and often post hoc to their underlying theories (from consultations 
with their proponents), but this is exactly the reason for our trying to distinguish them: this complex 
question has so far largely eluded a clear treatment that entails testable predictions.  
 [Insert Table 1] 
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Methods & Participants 
Generation of Definitions 
We first drafted definitions of BTs and CAs by reviewing relevant literature and consolidating the 
authors’ respective characterizations (i.e., Asendorpf & Motti-Stefanidi, 2018; DeYoung, 2015; Kandler 
et al., 2014; and McCrae & Costa, 2008). We contacted each of the lead authors, along with one additional 
expert, to review our descriptions. All experts responded with feedback on the definitions themselves and 
the project more generally. After revision based on their recommendations, we finalized our definitions 
as follows:  
1. Traits: Basic tendencies that predispose individuals to their typical thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. It is assumed that traits are innate to all humans, regardless of their particular life 
circumstances and experiences. People may differ in the magnitude to which they have traits, but 
the nature of the traits is the same for everyone. You can think of it this way: people from very 
different cultures may have the same traits, and people many centuries ago also could have had 
them. 
2. Adaptations: Habitual reactions that people have learned in response to their specific social, 
cultural, and physical environments. Sometimes, these may be different from what one would 
predict based on their traits. Unlike traits, people from different cultures and periods of history 
may have different adaptations. 
BT and CA Ratings of Items 
We considered educated but naive-to-the-underlying-theories raters, equipped with a clear task 
description, suitable judges for rating the degrees to which items’ correspond to BT- and CA-definitions: 
they had limited or cursory prior knowledge on the BT-CA debate and little to no vested interest in it. 
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However, the items were also rated by a few experts on the topic, allowing us to quantify expert-naive 
rater agreement. As we expected the task of learning and immediately applying these abstract theoretical 
concepts to be challenging for raters, we first piloted the task on three individuals to ensure its feasibility 
(in the Bipolar condition—see below). The pilot raters were the two authors of the study and the partner 
of one of the authors. The partner and the first author had minimal experience with the concepts at the 
time of completing the task. With a single-rater ICC of .44 [95% CI .36, .51] and average-rater ICC of .70 
[95% CI .63, .76], we judged it likely that there would be enough “signal” in the ratings of multiple raters 
and chose to proceed with the study. Although we recognize the potential bias involved in the sample used 
for the pilot, the subsequent relationships between these pilot and ensuing non-pilot ratings (below) lend 
us more confidence in the task. 
We initially recruited 26 individuals to rate the 240 items of the Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) in the extent to which they resemble BTs and/or CAs, but 
the average consensus was generally low—lower than among the ratings in the pilot study. We thus 
realized a larger participant pool, ultimately recruiting 65 raters. All of the raters had at least some post-
secondary education and were aged between 22 and 62 with a median age of 25; 36 had no formal 
connection to psychology, and all others were either 1) former or current students or 2) otherwise had 
some experience of psychological research; 2 were experts in having published papers on the BT-CA 
distinction, and 1 was an expert in being a researcher in psychometrics and personality. Participants were 
presented with the following text: “Below is a list of items typically used by personality researchers to 
measure personality characteristics. It is sometimes thought that such items reflect at least two distinct, 
but related, things.” This was followed by the definitions of “traits” and “adaptations” given above.  
According to the duality principle in FFT, items assess both BTs and CAs, whereas other 
perspectives such as CB5T claim that there is a clear distinction between the two. To test these competing 
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claims, we randomized participants to one of four rating conditions. After reading the definitions, 
participants received condition-specific instructions which allowed us to assess the extent to which a given 
item measured BTs or CAs (CB5T) or both simultaneously (FFT). In the Trait condition (T; N = 13), 
participants rated items as traits on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“It does not reflect a trait”) to 5 (“It 
clearly reflects a trait”). The Adaptation condition (A; N = 13) was identical but asked participants to rate 
items as CAs. We refer to these conditions as Independent. The Bipolar condition (V; N = 24, including 
pilot raters and expert raters) instructed participants to rate items on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“It 
clearly reflects a trait”) to 5 (“It clearly reflects an adaptation”). The Both (Tb/Ab; N = 15) condition 
required participants to rate items on both their BT-ness and CA-ness and contained the following 
instructions after the definitions: “Please rate each item on the extent to which it clearly measures either 
of them. In addition to measuring clearly either trait or adaptation (use a high score), any item could 
equally measure both or none of them at the same time (use a low score), or more one than the other (use 
the appropriate option in the middle of the scale).  The scales range from 1 (it does not measure a 
trait/adaptation) to 5 (it clearly measures a trait/adaptation). For example, if you think an item clearly 
measures both a trait and an adaptation, you might select "5" for both categories. Similarly, if you think 
an item somewhat measures a trait but not an adaptation, you might select "4" and "2," respectively.” 
Participants then saw items with options to rate them 1-5 as a trait and as an adaptation. Finally, just prior 
to being presented the items, participants in all conditions were presented with the following reminder: 
“Please keep in mind that you are being asked to rate items for their content and not to respond to the item 
itself.” After completing the task, participants were instructed to include their age, gender, and 
academic/professional background. Given the preliminary nature of the project and the foreseeable 
difficulty of the task, we also provided participants with a space to leave comments about the study 
(available in the Online Supplemental Material: https://osf.io/3cebh/). All ratings were completed using 
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Qualtrics Survey Software with the exception of 2 pilot raters (including the first author) and 2 of the 
experts, who used a spreadsheet for their convenience. 
Heritability, Rank-Order Stability, and Consensual Validity 
Items’ heritability (based on 2,811 twin pairs), cross-rater agreement (based on 5,421 to 5,441 
individuals), and longitudinal stability (based on 1,736 individuals) estimates were obtained from the 
meta-analysis conducted by Mõttus and colleagues (2019). This study estimated raw and residual variance 
of NEO-PI-R items in independent samples from Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States. Full descriptions of the original projects are available in the Online 
Supplemental Material (https://osf.io/3cebh/).  
Reliability 
Associations among and between empirical criteria and definitional BT-ness/CA-ness of items 
could be confounded by their differential reliability (e.g., reflecting differences in ambiguity). Therefore, 
we aimed to control for inter-item differences in re-test reliability. Mõttus and colleagues (2019) estimated 
items’ retest reliabilities (over one week) to disattenuate their average estimates of items’ heritability, 
stability and consensual validity. However, their estimates were based on a 100-item FFM scale (Goldberg 
et. al, 2006; Kosinski et al., 2015), so only the average item reliability could be estimated. We, therefore, 
collected one-week re-test reliability data using Prolific, an online participant-recruitment platform. Our 
initial sample consisted of 313 individuals. After cleaning the data for un-effortful responding, a sample 
of N = 263 participants remained (mean age 38.6 years, SD = 11.1; 159 females). All participants worked 
at least part-time. Participants were re-directed by Prolific to an online form where they completed the 
NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) twice within a 7-to-10-day period.  
We had reason to believe that parts of our data were susceptible to un-effortful responding. While 
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administering the survey at Time 1, the survey website suffered from extreme lag due to the high number 
of participants using the system simultaneously. Thus, we were particularly strict in our assessment of 
data quality. We used a variety of methods to clean the data for un-effortful responding (e.g., evidence for 
repeating or random responses), ultimately excluding 50 participants from the original sample. Full details 
of the data-cleaning process can be found in the Online Supplemental Material (https://osf.io/3cebh/).  
In the final data, the median 7-10-day re-test reliability of raw items was .64 (M = .64, SD = .09, 
range = .36 to .87). This is consistent with estimates that Mõttus and colleagues (2019) reported (a median 
of .66), which were based on a much larger sample. Given the relatively small sample, standard errors of 
the correlations in the current study were nearly .05 and 95% confidence intervals therefore nearly .10, 
but one could expect that the uncertainties of individual estimates tended to cancel out in analyses 
integrating across the 240 items. 
Social Desirability 
A well-studied property in which traits and items can differ is their social desirability or 
evaluativeness (e.g., Allik, Realo, & Mõttus, 2010; Anglim, Morse, de Vries, MacCann, & Marty, 2017). 
Therefore, we deemed it worthwhile to explore whether the BT-CA distinction in items intersects with 
their perceived evaluativeness (either desirability or undesirability). We employed the social desirability 
ratings of the 240 NEO-PI-R items used in Allik and colleagues (2010); these data had been provided by 
276 raters from four countries (N = 30, 100, 126 and 20, respectively for Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
and Germany) based on four languages (Flemish, Czech, Estonian and German), using a scale from -3 
(“extremely undesirable”) to 3 (“extremely desirable”). We quantified items’ evaluativeness as the 
average absolute values of their desirability ratings (i.e., deviations from the neutral midpoint, 0), 
calculated first within each of the four countries and then aggregated into “pan-cultural” average ratings 
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(i.e., means from each country had equal weights in the aggregate ratings). Although none of the ratings 
had been based on the English version of the NEO-PI-R, it is plausible that different item translations 
deviated from English more or less randomly and therefore the pan-cultural evaluativeness scores were 
comparable to those that could have been obtained based on the English version of the NEO-PI-R.  
Variance 
We also examined the potentially confounding role of items’ variance in associations between item 
ratings and empirical criteria. Mõttus and colleagues (2019) found that items with more variance had 
higher meta-analytic estimates for cross-rater agreement ρ = .52 (p < .001), heritability ρ = .43 (p < .001), 
and stability ρ = .54 (p < .001). However, controlling for items’ standard deviations did not substantially 
affect correlations between heritability, stability, and cross-rater agreement (ρ = .35 to ρ = .43, p < .001), 
leading them to suggest that “inter-item differences in variance were unlikely to be the only cause for why 
items systematically differed in their nuancedness” (p. 43, Mõttus et al., 2019). If an item’s perceived BT-
/CA-ness is one of these causes, then it could be useful to control for items’ variance.  
 
Results 
All analyses were carried out using R (R Core Team, 2018). All code and data used to produce 
these results can be accessed in the “Ratings & Analysis” folder in the Online Supplemental Material 
(https://osf.io/3cebh/); the available files also allow for alternative analyses (e.g., correlating item ratings 
with residual estimates of empirical properties). We include a spreadsheet (“ItemDataComprehensive.csv”) 
that compiles estimates for rating conditions, evaluativeness, and (raw and residual) estimates of cross-
rater agreement, rank-order stability, heritability, re-test reliability, and variance for all 240 NEO-PI-R 
items. The attached Appendix includes an abbreviated version of this table (also available in the Online 
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Supplemental Material) containing only estimates of the criteria analyzed in the present study. Descriptive 
statistics of and intercorrelations among items’ ratings, empirical criteria, and potential confounds are 
included in the Appendix as well.  
NEO-PI-R Item Ratings 
Table 2 contains estimates of inter-rater reliability (single- and average-rater intra-class 
correlations; ICC) in each condition. Cicchetti (1994) advised that an average-rater ICC of less than .40 
is poor, .40 to .59 fair, .60 to .74 good, and .75 to 1.00 excellent. According to these criteria, T, A, Ab, and 
Tb ratings had fair average-rater ICCs, whereas the consensus for V (Bipolar) ratings was excellent. 
Evidently, rating items in the degrees to which they corresponded to the definitions of BTs and CAs 
independently was difficult, but raters found it somewhat easier to contrast BTs to CAs than rating any 
one of them alone.  
We then calculated mean item ratings within each condition and correlated these across conditions 
(Table 3). The average pilot ratings were consistent with the average non-pilot ratings (excluding expert 
ratings) obtained in the Bipolar condition (ρ = .42, p < .001). Items rated as BTs/CAs in the Independent 
condition also tended to be rated as BTs/CAs in the Both condition (ρ = .47/.58, p < .001), suggesting 
convergent validity (Table 3). Conversely, there were negative correlations between mean BT and CA 
ratings (ρ = -.56 to -.25, p < .001) with the exception of T/Ab (ρ = -.08, p = .224), suggesting that 
definitionally BT-like items tended to be rated lower in CA-ness. Likewise, the average ratings in the 
Bipolar condition correlated negatively with average BT-ness ratings (ρ = -.48 to -.62, p < .001) and 
positively (ρ = .46 to .63, p < .001) with average CA-ness ratings in the Both and Independent conditions.  
Expert ratings showed reasonable overlap with both lay and pilot ratings. The ratings of the two 
experts who have published on the distinction were both in the Bipolar condition and correlated ρ = .40 
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(p < .001) with one another. The third expert was in the A condition; their ratings correlated ρ = .19 (p 
= .003) and ρ = .22 (p < .001) with the others’ ratings. We denote the average ratings of the first two EV, 
while we label the third EA. EV ratings correlated ρ = .65 and .47 with average pilot and non-pilot ratings, 
respectively (p < .001). Meanwhile, EA correlated ρ = .33 (p < .001) with average A ratings. When 
averaging the ratings of all three experts, these correlated ρ = -.31, ρ = .39, ρ = .28, ρ = -.40, and ρ = .58 
with respective mean ratings for T, A, Ab, Tb, and V (p < .001); all average ratings in these associations 
were calculated excluding expert and pilot ratings. These results suggest that while nuanced differences 
in perceptions of the BT-CA distinction may exist between experts and laypersons, expert ratings tend to 
follow the same patterns as lay ones, and the differences do not appear more pronounced than those 
between any given group of raters.  
Given the substantial T-Tb and A-Ab associations, we aggregated both BT- and CA-ratings into 
(Combined) Tc and (Combined) Ac ratings, respectively. The average-rater ICCs for Tc and Ac were ICC 
= .68, 95% CI [.62, .74] and .72, 95% CI [.66, .77]. The Tc and Ac ratings correlated ρ = -.47, 95% CI [-.57, 
-.36] with each other and ρ = -.65, 95% CI [-.72, -.56] and ρ = .60, 95% CI [.51, .68] with the Bipolar 
ratings (p < 10-10). These findings suggest that a) the combined ratings were sufficiently reliable according 
to Cicchetti’s (1994) recommendations for ICCs, and b) items rated as corresponding to the definition of 
a BT were less likely to be rated as corresponding to the definition of a CA. Based on the consistencies 
found across conditions, we also formed an overall CA-ness score for each item (AO, M = 0, SD = .35) by 
combining items’ average standardized ratings from each condition (reversing those in the Trait 
conditions). AO (N = 80 partly overlapping raters) had an excellent average-rater ICC of .92 (95% CI 
[.90, .93]) and correlated -.54 and -.81 with Independent and Both Trait conditions, .77 and .70 with 
Independent and Both Adaptation ratings, and .89 with Bipolar ratings (p < .001).  
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The five most CA-like items dealt with tolerating controversial ideas, thinking politicians must 
pay more attention to human needs, thinking that policy should keep up with a changing world, believing 
religion should not dictate morals, and thinking it is fine for adults to change their mind on what is right. 
The five most BT-like items were to do with having a bustling imagination, having many emotions, being 
persistent and unyielding, being full of energy, and loving to talk to people. We also divided items into 
quintiles based on their AO rating and examined the distributions of item ratings by domain (Table 4).  
Mean ratings for NEO-PI-R domains were AO = -.08, -.17, -.04, .21, and 0 for Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, respectively. We 
conducted a one-way ANOVA across domains and found significant differences in average BT-CA ratings 
([F(4, 235) = 8.58, p < 10-6). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey test indicated that the differences 
between mean AO ratings for Agreeableness on the one hand, and Extraversion and Neuroticism on the 
other, were significant after Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons (p < 10-6 and p < .001, 
respectively; the adjusted significance threshold was p = .005). Thus, while items for Neuroticism and 
Extraversion were rated as more CA-like and less BT-like than those for Agreeableness, no other inter-
domain differences in ratings were significant.  
[Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4] 
Relationships between Items’ Empirical Trait-Criteria and their BT/CA Ratings 
We used the Tc, Ac, Bipolar, and AO conditions to examine associations of items’ definitional BT-
ness and CA-ness with their empirical trait criteria (Table 5).  
Items that were rated more CA-like in the combined Adaptation condition (Ac) demonstrated 
significantly lower cross-rater agreement and rank-order stability (p < .001). Likewise, items’ combined 
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CA-ness/BT-ness scores (AO) had negative correlations with agreement and stability (p = .002 and  p 
= .009). No significant relationships were observed in any other conditions.  
Items’ 7-10-day retest reliability estimates were largely unrelated to their BT-/CA-ratings, 
correlating ρ = .01 (p = .885), ρ = -.12 (p = .060), ρ = -.04 (p = .538), and ρ = -.06 (p = .348) with Tc, Ac, 
V, and AO. However, they had substantial associations with items’ empirical properties, correlating ρ = .57 
(p = .001), ρ = .56 (p < .001), and ρ = .49 (p < .001) with cross-rater agreement, rank-order stability, and 
heritability, respectively. After controlling for retest reliability, two further associations (between Tc on 
the one hand and cross-rater agreement and stability on the other) reached nominal significance (p = .042 
and p = .047), forming a mirror-image of the associations with Ac. Otherwise, controlling for re-test 
reliability had a negligible impact on the associations.  
Items’ evaluativeness correlated inconsistently with their BT-/CA-ratings, with ρ = .10 (p = .106), 
ρ = .27 (p < .001), and ρ = -.16 (p = .015) for Tc, Ac and V, respectively; AO was not related to 
evaluativeness (ρ = .02, p = .707). However, more evaluative items had lower cross-rater agreement, 
stability, and heritability—ρ = -.21 (p = .001), ρ = -.27 (p < .001), and ρ = -.19 (p = .003), respectively—
suggesting that neutral items tend to convey more consensually valid, stable, and heritable information 
about people than more evaluative items. Controlling for evaluativeness had no attenuating effect on the 
associations between either Ac or AO and empirical trait criteria, but caused the associations between cross-
rater agreement and stability on the one hand, and Tc and V on the other, to reach significance (p = .031 
and p = .024 for Tc; p = .049 and p = .041 for V).  
Items’ standard deviations correlated ρ = -.18 (p = .006), ρ = -.19 (p = .003), ρ = .15 (p = .024), 
and ρ = .03 (p = .640) with Tc, Ac, V, and AO. Re-calculating associations between items’ CA-/BT-ratings 
and empirical criteria while controlling for items’ standard deviations reinforced the pattern of more 
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adaptation-like items having lower stability and cross-rater agreement: five of eight partial correlations of 
items’ ratings with stability and cross-rater agreement were significant at p < .001. Meanwhile, although 
the association between Ac and stability was attenuated (ρ = -.16, p = .015), correlations between V on one 
hand, and stability and agreement on the other, reached significance (ρ = -.20, p = .002; ρ = -.19, p = .003). 
The direction of correlation was consistent across conditions (i.e., positive associations with Tc and 
negative with all others).  
Likewise, when simultaneously controlling for re-test reliability, evaluativeness, and standard 
deviation, seven of eight partial correlations of items’ CA-/BT-ratings with cross-rater agreement and 
rank-order stability were significant at p < .01 (the relationship between Ac and stability lost significance: 
ρ = -.12, p = .060), with four p-values less than .001. Bipolar associations with stability and cross-rater 
agreement were significant at p = .007 and p = .006, while the correlation between overall adaptation-ness 
and rank-order stability was significant at p = .002.  
In summary, items’ definitional BT-ness, as opposed to definitional CA-ness, demonstrated 
significant associations with the empirical trait criteria of higher cross-rater agreement and rank-order 
stability. The associations were not strong, but they were consistent across different operationalizations 
of BT-/CA-ness, including when controlling for items’ re-test reliability, evaluativeness and/or variance.   
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Discussion 
Several prominent personality theories rely on the distinction between traits and CAs (e.g., 
DeYoung, 2015; McCrae & Sutin, 2018; McAdams & Pals, 2006). However, there have only been a few 
attempts to elucidate specific, empirically testable criteria for distinguishing between the two kinds of 
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constructs. Moreover, individual questionnaire items that often refer to what many theories would consider 
CAs at face value (e.g., liking roller coasters) have turned out to capture unique variance (nuances) with 
empirical trait-like properties that cannot be ascribed to the aggregate personality traits these items were 
designed to measure, making the trait-adaptation distinction even less self-evident.  
Relying on published theoretical views and input from the advocates of several of the relevant 
theories, we attempted to a) clearly define traits and CAs, b) characterize a number of item-level traits in 
the degrees to which they corresponded to the definitions of traits (BTs) and/or CAs and c) investigate the 
associations between the definitional and empirical properties of these item-level traits. Our main findings 
were that a) items appearing definitionally more BT-like did appear definitionally less CA-like and b) 
showed somewhat higher cross-rater agreement and long-term stability, but no differences in heritability. 
Further, c) these relationships were retained—and even marginally strengthened—when controlling for 
possible confounders such as items’ re-test reliability, variance, and evaluativeness. In other words, the 
more stable over many years and the more similarly observable to people themselves and their informants 
that narrow personality characteristics—nuances—tended to be, the more they corresponded to what some 
theorists could consider BTs, or traits.  
These findings were not expected per se but were consistent across rating conditions, at least when 
possible confounders were controlled for. To us, the association of definitional trait-ness with stability 
appears consistent with some of the relevant theories such as FFT and CB5T, even though their proponents 
have often refrained from explicitly committing to the hypothesis. Perhaps ironically, thus, we may have 
found more support for these theories than their proponents could hope for. 
Methodological considerations 
The characterizations of items as corresponding definitionally to BTs and/or CAs were obtained 
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using ratings of (mostly) naive raters. On the one hand, this may seem like a limitation: why should we 
trust non-experts for such conceptual judgments? On the other hand, the raters were instructed based on 
clear and theory-based definitions of BTs and CAs that had been made in consultation with experts 
beforehand, and we have no reason to assume that the raters systematically deviated from these definitions 
when providing the ratings. Based on the modest inter-rater agreement within most conditions, raters 
apparently found it hard to judge the degrees to which items reflected BTs and CAs or either of them, 
although they apparently found it easier to contrast items in these two degrees when directly asked to do 
so (as evidenced by higher inter-rater agreement in the Bipolar condition). However, the plausibly non-
systematic deviations of the ratings from the “true” degrees of the item properties being rated could cancel 
out in the average ratings, consistent with a reasonable pattern of convergent and discriminant correlations 
across rating conditions and acceptable average-rater ICCs, especially with data from all conditions 
combined.  
It could even be argued that naïve raters benefited from not being “contaminated” by having 
worked with the testing material and/or on the particular theoretical question beforehand, and they 
presumably had limited vested theoretical interest in this research question (unlike experts, possibly)—
they just followed the instructions or non-systematically deviated from them. And yet, the independently-
provided ratings of the authors of the study converged with the average ratings of the naive raters. Further, 
ratings provided by experts—researchers who have investigated these theories—did not dramatically 
differ from those of naïve raters. Overall, thus, we believe that we secured reasonably good estimates of 
the degrees to which the items were definitionally BTs and/or CAs. Almost certainly, these are the best 
data currently available on the question. 
Could the instructions given to raters and providing them with both BT and CA definitions in all 
rating conditions have contributed to the BT-ness and CA-ness ratings being negatively correlated? This 
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seems possible: even in conditions where raters rated only either items’ BT-ness or CA-ness, they may 
have tacitly contrasted the property that they rated to the other property because they had been given 
definitions of both. This should be considered as a limitation when interpreting the finding that items that 
appeared more BT-like tended to be less CA-like, and vice versa, although it should not confound our 
other findings. One way to address this would be to provide two groups of raters with only one of the two 
definitions, have them rate items on that characteristic (either BT or CA), and compare these ratings both 
to each other and to our findings.  
Hypotheses 
Tentatively assuming that the ratings approximated the true values of items’ BT-/CA-ness, our 
results offer some support for the claim made by CB5T (and NB5 and DAE) that personality 
characteristics represent either a BT or a CA, but not both at the same time. Examination of the most 
extreme items in AO corroborates this: item content such as beliefs about politics or religion tended to be 
CA-like, whereas items asking about one’s general energy levels or persistence were rated the most BT-
like. In line with our definitions, the most BT-like items assess broad, plausibly universal psychological 
tendencies that any human in any culture throughout evolutionary time could be ascribed to. Meanwhile, 
CA-like item content is more specific to one’s culture, environment, and upbringing.  
According to FFT, it could be argued that individuals’ responses to even the most BT-like items 
still partly reflect CAs, representing manifestations of their self-concept through “duality once-removed” 
(McCrae & Sutin, 2018). A claim consistent with FFT could be that what we measured in the present 
study was the extent to which items were “global” or “behavioral” (e.g., “I am extraverted” vs. “I talk to 
lots of people at parties”), rather than quantifying either BTs or CAs. One might test this empirically by 
asking people to rate items in the degree to which they measure one or the other and then compare these 
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ratings to our BT/CA-ratings, hypothesizing a positive association between items’ BT-ness and globality. 
However, the extent to which the definitions of item globality vs behavioral-ness meaningfully differ from 
those of BTs and CAs is not yet clear. Some may even suspect that distinguishing one distinction from 
another is a semantic question rather than a more broadly theoretical issue.  
Although proponents of the main theories that utilize BTs and CAs have commented on how these 
might correspond to empirical criteria typically used to assess trait-ness, none—both per the theories and 
based on the kind feedback from the authors themselves—explicitly predicted relationships between items’ 
BT- or CA-ness and any of the empirical trait criteria of heritability, long-term stability, or cross-rater 
agreement (Table 1). Indeed, the only predictions we made were ad hoc to the proponents’ theoretical 
expectations, with explicit reasons for these given in the introduction. Counter to the null hypotheses of 
both FFT and CB5T, we found associations between items’ cross-rater agreement and stability on the one 
hand and ratings for BT-ness on the other. This was in line with one of our ad hoc hypotheses derived 
from CB5T and FFT that suggested BT-like items may be more stable than those rated as CAs. The 
positive association between BT-ness and cross-rater agreement was not even hypothesized ad hoc. 
Despite both FFT and CB5T plausibly leading to the ad hoc prediction that heritability may be positively 
associated with BT-ness, our findings failed to support it—no rating condition had significant correlations 
with heritability. This is consistent with the suggestion that traits’ heritability estimates carry little 
meaningful information about the inherent properties of the traits (Johnson et al., 2011; Turkheimer et al., 
2014). Now we have more evidence for this. 
Implications for the trait-adaptation distinction 
We experienced considerable difficulties with putting forward specific hypotheses regarding the 
differences between BTs and CAs in their properties, even after having consulted with relevant theorists. 
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Further, the open comments of participants suggested general confusion over what constituted either a BT 
or CA. Yet, despite these challenges, a noisy consensus emerged in each rating condition which averaged 
to an excellent average inter-rater agreement across all ratings. In other words, definitionally 
distinguishing between BTs and CAs seems possible in principle, even though the judgment may be 
difficult for any one person for any given construct. Moreover, our findings offer preliminary evidence 
for the trait-adaptation distinction having some empirical consequences. This should encourage theorists 
to elaborate on the distinction between traits and (characteristic) adaptations, a recommendation also made 
by Kandler and colleagues (2014).  
Among possible implications, there may be empirically testable consequences to the distinction, 
if elaborated, clearly defined, and measured—all of which we attempted to do, but which surely can be 
done better still. For example, it may be that more BT-like constructs have different developmental causes 
and trajectories than more CA-like constructs. Lumping BT- and CA-like nuances (items) into broad 
aggregates such as the Big Five may explain why they have been hard to reliably link with specific genetic 
variants (Lo et al., 2017) or life experience (Denissen et al., 2019) or why these broad aggregates filter 
out a substantial part of the otherwise measurable age differences in personality (Mõttus & Rozgonjuk, in 
press). Also, it may be that BT- and CA-like nuances differ in how they are linked with life outcomes in 
general or with specific types of outcomes; for example, it may be that specific adaptations drive 
associations with narrow, circumscribed outcomes, while BTs drive associations with broad life outcomes 
that draw on many trait domains over extended periods of time. In other words, deconstructing and/or 
differentiating between personality traits according to their BT-ness and CA-ness may open new research 
avenues into understanding how personality develops and plays out over the life course. 
Traits or “Traits”? 
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One can distinguish between two definitions of the word “trait”. First, it can refer to any stable, 
observable and potentially genetically-based psychological construct. Extraversion is a trait, narcissism is 
a trait, being securely attached to important others is a trait, supporting conservative politicians and/or 
pro-environmental policies are traits. Second, a trait can more narrowly refer to BTs as opposed to CAs, 
with the latter also showing some of the properties typically associated with traits in the first and broader 
sense.   
We have tried to keep these two definitions apart in this paper (e.g., by referring to only the BT-
CA distinction when describing our own findings), although we admit to this being very difficult, not least 
because these two meanings of traits are routinely mixed up in the literature. The empirical nature of the 
first definition may not be directly applicable to the BT-CA distinction; stability, agreement, and 
heritability cannot be used as criteria to accurately distinguish between the two phenomena, even though 
our findings show that there is some association between stability and agreement on the one hand and BT-
ness of traits on the other6. Thus, this study did not identify clear criteria to distinguish BTs from CAs, 
but rather investigated whether measurable differences in empirical properties exist between items based 
on the definitional BT-/CA-ness of their content—and we found some. We would argue that these 
empirical properties of traits more generally and of BTs in particular—stability and cross-rater 
agreement—can already offer some guidance in navigating the kinds of personality constructs used by 
psychologists, and should they be conceptually elaborated on in the future, the guidance may become 
handier still. 
If we were to revert to and stay with the original stances of FFT and CB5T in that these empirical 
 
6 According to one reviewer, “[b]y definition, empirical trait-properties for the first definition of ‘trait’ are not empirical trait-properties for 
the second definition.” 
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criteria are of little use, this would present a conundrum for the BT-CA distinction—and for the authors 
of this paper. Much of the research on the Big Five specifically and the trait hierarchy more generally has 
focused on heritability, rank-order stability, and cross-rater agreement as evidence for the ontology of 
traits (e.g., Funder, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 2008). But if these properties cannot, after all, be used to 
distinguish BTs from CAs, then what can? Or, if there is no point in seeking empirical criteria to 
distinguish between the two at all (as one reviewer suggests), then what purpose does the distinction serve, 
other than to be a theoretical carpet under which to sweep otherwise inexplicable patterns?  
Theories should be falsifiable, and achieving this begins with delineating empirical criteria with 
which to ultimately test them. That we encountered such difficulties in generating (largely null) 
hypotheses that would allow empirically separating traits and adaptations—including after personal 
communications with and reviews from several of the authors of the theories—indicates that the distinction 
may be too vague in its current form. While we do recognize the conceptual convenience—or indeed 
necessity—of distinguishing between the two kinds of constructs, we cannot be certain whether the 
distinction in its current form clarifies or in fact obscures our understanding of the personality system. For 
example, non-theorists should be able to readily draw predictions from a theory without having to consult 
its author(s) (even if the authors are extremely forthcoming in their assistance). Thus, we urge theorists to 
more clearly delineate better-formalized and empirically-testable definitions of the distinction between 
BTs and CAs.  
Narrow Constructs, Broad Content 
 To the extent that de-contextualized BT-like items may convey somewhat more (empirically) trait-
like information, this study seems to offer evidence against the use of contextually specific items and for 
the use of more global and universal items. Moreover, despite the associations between evaluativeness, 
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variance, and re-test reliability on the one hand with stability and observability on the other, items’ ratings 
for BT/CA-ness did not show systematic relationships with any of the former. In other words, utilizing 
items that are assessments of more global and universal personality constructs appears to improve 
empirical validity (in the sense of stability and agreement) beyond the effect of simply being “good” 
items—stable over short periods, non-evaluative, sufficiently variable.  
This finding, while possibly in line with theorists’ conceptions of traits, may feel somewhat 
counter-intuitive, given the recent evidence that narrower personality constructs (nuances) contain 
incremental information over and above higher-order traits and facets. Early evidence suggests that 
outcome-predictions are mostly driven by items’ unique variance (rather than variance shared with other 
items and thereby defining higher-order constructs; Seeboth & Mõttus, 2018). In this sense, would it not 
be more logical that specific, contextualized personality traits provide more information than abstract 
descriptors? Apparently not. Perhaps within the level of nuances, there can exist a useful balance between 
specificity and breadth. Or perhaps the items’ useful unique variance is not their CA-ness but in their 
unique BT-ness. Future research should investigate whether it is more BT- or CA-like items—if either—
that provide better predictions of life outcomes. Indeed, it would seem that anything providing more 
information—which may or may not often mean BT-like items—will generally have an upper hand.  
In what other domains might the content of BT- and CA-like items meaningfully (empirically) 
differ? We considered three possibilities (evaluativeness, standard deviation, and re-test reliability) and 
mentioned “globality” vs. “behavioral-ness,” but there are a host of other rateable properties that items 
contain and that we could not examine in the present study. For example, one might also consider the 
psychological modality—the extent to which an item assesses affect, behavior, cognition, or motivation 
(desire) (Wilt & Revelle, 2015)—or other features on which items vary such as importance, level of 
abstraction, state-ness vs. trait-ness, or base rate (e.g., Leising, Scharloth, Lohse, & Wood, 2014), among 
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others. Future research should examine relationships between such properties and those that we considered 
here—stability, cross-rater agreement, and heritability—to better understand the unique, myriad ways 
item content behaves in the personality system. In the long run, this may help with studying the principles 
of personality development and intersections with life outcomes. 
On the usefulness of re-test reliability 
A corollary finding of this study was that items’ short-term re-test reliability was a fairly strong 
predictor of other empirical item properties such as cross-rater agreement, long-term stability, and 
heritability—these were among the strongest associations reported in this study. This, consistent with 
previous facet-level findings of McCrae and colleagues (2011), may prove to be a very useful finding in 
that it allows predicting which items convey more information about individual differences than others: 
items with low-retest reliability are probably of lower quality (e.g., ambiguous or without clear 
psychological referents for raters) or pertain to traits that are inherently harder to reliably measure with 
self-reports. (Of note is that Big Five domains explained only 6% of the variability in re-test correlations, 
whereas facets explained 24%.) Test-constructors are thus encouraged to test for the re-test reliability of 
individual items and, if possible, not use those with low reliability—they are less likely to carry useful 
information and could be replaced with those that do convey additional reliable information (McCrae & 
Mõttus, 2019).  
 
Conclusion 
Advancement of knowledge is promoted through informed, open discourse, and theories are 
written to be tested. Yet, despite its various conceptualizations, the BT-CA distinction has largely eluded 
empirical scrutiny so far. In this study, we offered an initial investigation with the goal of furthering the 
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theoretical conversation with novel empirical evidence—to some effect, judging from reviewer comments 
and our fruitful interactions with the proponents of some of the most relevant theories, for which we are 
extremely grateful.  
According to our results, narrow traits—in the form of items—that raters perceived as measuring 
something more universal-looking and applicable throughout human evolutionary history tended to be 
somewhat more 1) stable over long periods and 2) observable to others in ways that were consistent with 
self-perceptions. This suggests that definitional BT-ness indexes a unique property of personality items 
that appears to be at least partially linked to the items’ empirical properties. The most straightforward 
explanation for this would be that items asking about broad, universal characteristics are indeed measuring 
something more stable and observable—a unique personality trait. On the one hand, this may seem 
unsurprising. On the other hand, given the current murkiness of the CA-BT distinction, this may be 
nothing short of snatching a victory from the jaws of defeat—we now have at least one empirical handle 
on the distinction from which to work. Not a perfect handle, but one all the same. Hopefully, our work 
will help to elucidate this predominantly under-explored question of personality science.  
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Table 1. Predictions of associations between item ratings and empirical trait criteria based on the 
Five-Factor Theory and Cybernetic Big Five Theory. 
Criterion Theory 
 FFT CB5T 
Stability T = A (an ad hoc possibility: T >A)  T = A (an ad hoc possibility: T >A) 
Heritability T = A (an ad hoc possibility: T >A) T = A (an ad hoc possibility: T >A) 
Agreement T = A T = A 
Note.  “T = A” predicts no difference between items’ BT-ness or CA-ness in the criterion. “T > A” 
predicts systematic positive associations between the criterion and items’ BT-ness. Because neither 
the DAE nor NB5 theories make explicit predictions about the heritability, stability, or cross-rater 
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agreement of traits vs. adaptations (DAE explicitly avoids using them as distinguishing criteria), we 
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Table 2. Single and average random rater intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) for initial 
rating conditions as well as combined across all conditions. 
Condition Single-Rater  ICC Average-Rater ICC 
A: Only adaptation rated (N = 13) .09 [.07, .12] .57 [.49, .64] 
Ab: Adaption when both rated (N = 15) .08 [.06, .11] .57 [.48, .64] 
T: Only trait rated (N = 13) .07 [.05, .09] .48 [.38, .57] 
Tb ; Trait when both rated (N = 15) .09 [.06, .12] .59 [.50, .66] 
V: Trait vs adaptation (Bipolar; N = 24) .16 [.13, .19] .82 [.78, .85] 
AO : all ratings (N = 80) .12 [.10, .15] .92 [.90, .93] 
Note. Tb and T ratings were reversed and all ratings standardized to create AO. 95% confidence 
intervals in brackets. p < .001. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for each rating condition and Spearman’s correlations of ratings 
across conditions. 
Condition M SD T A Tb Ab 
T: Only trait rated 3.32 0.47     
A: Only adaptation rated 2.85 0.50 -.25    
Tb ; Trait when both rated  3.44 0.46 .47 -.52   
Ab: Adaption when both 
rated 
3.29 0.48 -.08* .58 -.56  
V: Trait vs adaptation 
(Bipolar) 
2.68 0.57 -.48 .63 -.62 .46 
Note. M = Mean ratings (rated from 1 to 5). SD = standard deviation. Positive scores for Bipolar 
































Table 4. Distribution of AO item ratings by Big-Five domain.  
Quintile N E O A C  
1 13 15 13 2 5  
2 9 16 5 3 15  
3 10 7 11 9 11  
4 12 4 7 15 10  
5 4 6 12 19 7  
Note. First quintile represents the items with highest BT ratings 
(i.e., most negative AO values). 
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Table 5. Spearman’s correlations between item ratings and empirical trait-criteria.     
 Raw Correlation Retest Reliability Evaluativeness Standard Deviation Combined 
 rCA rRO h
2 rCA rRO h
2 rCA rRO h
2 rCA rRO h
2 rCA rRO h
2 
Tc .11 .11 -.06 .13* .13* -.07 .14* .15* -.04 .25** .25*** .02 .24*** .24*** -.01 
Ac -.29*** -.23*** -.11 -.27*** -.20** -.06 -.25*** -.17** -.07 -.22** -.16* -.03 -.22*** -.12 0 
V -.09 -.08 .04 -.08 -.07 .06 -.13* -.13* .01 -.20** -.19** -.03 -.18** -.18** 0 
Ao -.20** -.17** -.01 -.20** -.16* -.02 -.20** -.17** -.01 -.25*** -.22*** -.03 -.24*** -.20** 0 
Note. Positive V scores indicate adaptation-ness. rCA = cross-rater agreement; rRO = rank-order stability; h
2 = heritability. Column 
labels (e.g., “Retest Reliability”) indicate that associations were calculated while controlling for the listed criterion. * p < .05. ** p 






























Table A1. Estimates of BT-CA ratings, empirical criteria, and potential confounds for the 240 NEO-PI-R items, organized from most 
to least adaptation-like. 
  Item Ratings  Empirical Criteria  Confounds 
Code Indications of items (not items themselves) Tc Ac V AO  rCA rRO h
2  rTT eval var 
O6.3 Believes religion should not dictate morals 2.21 4.18 4.54 1.22  0.34 0.47 0.57  0.71 1.08 1.03 
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O6.2 Thinks that policy should keep up with 
changing world 
2.68 4.5 4.29 1.1  0.15 0.29 0.62  0.54 0.84 1.32 
A6.1 Thinks politicians must pay more attention 
to human needs 
2.86 4.21 4.5 1.01  0.24 0.31 0.44  0.54 0.84 1.55 
O6.1 Tolerates controversial ideas 2.14 3.86 4.04 1  0.25 0.36 0.42  0.57 0.98 1.39 
O6.7 Thinks it is fine for adults to change their 
mind on what is right 
2.18 3.68 4.21 1  0.24 0.31 0.45  0.64 1.04 1.05 
C1.2 Fulfils civic obligations 2.36 3.75 3.96 0.88  0.26 0.28 0.65  0.56 1.23 1.6 
A2.4 Believes that honesty is the best policy 2.64 4.18 3.75 0.87  0.29 0.27 0.38  0.53 1.05 1.26 
O2.3 Likes expressive dance 2.25 3.36 3.67 0.72  0.47 0.56 0.67  0.71 1.33 0.7 
O6.4 Is comfortable with people in other 
societies having different moral principles 
2.86 4.04 3.75 0.72  0.16 0.32 0.33  0.51 0.88 1.61 
A6.4 Feels for beggars 2.39 3.61 3.79 0.72  0.33 0.4 0.49  0.69 1.03 1.44 
O6.8 Is liberal in moral principles 2.57 3.57 3.92 0.7  0.26 0.41 0.61  0.58 0.9 0.72 
A1.3 Doesn't think people are after each other 2.61 3.79 3.5 0.66  0.25 0.43 0.45  0.72 1.06 1.32 
A6.3 Thinks that more should be done for those 
in need 
2.79 3.57 3.67 0.61  0.23 0.45 0.53  0.61 1 1.23 
A6.5 Puts human consideration ahead of 
economic benefits 
3.32 3.75 4.08 0.6  0.16 0.37 0.42  0.6 0.88 1.43 
E5.2 Likes garish destinations 2.93 3.46 3.83 0.58  0.4 0.49 0.61  0.76 1.38 1.13 
C3.3 Doesn't like to owe 3.14 3.93 3.29 0.53  0.38 0.41 0.58  0.85 1.01 1.98 
C3.4 Doesn't cheat in games 2.54 3.32 3.46 0.5  0.25 0.32 0.57  0.66 1.16 1.09 
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A1.5 Doesn't worry that kinds acts have ulterior 
meanings 
3 3.89 3.25 0.5  0.21 0.28 0.41  0.73 0.89 1.26 
E4.7 Lives a fast-moving life 2.79 3.61 3.42 0.49  0.44 0.44 0.56  0.74 1.1 0.95 
A1.1 Trusts others’ intentions 2.68 3.86 2.83 0.47  0.21 0.41 0.5  0.6 1.04 1.44 
O4.4 Tries different foods 2.75 3.46 3.21 0.47  0.44 0.52 0.63  0.76 1.2 1.11 
C1.6 Appears successful across the board 2.46 3.5 3.04 0.46  0.31 0.32 0.5  0.69 1.02 1.2 
A6.8 Would be lenient rather than fair 2.82 3.54 3.38 0.46  0.21 0.33 0.5  0.46 0.92 0.94 
N4.6 Feels uneasy around authority figures 3.14 3.71 3.38 0.45  0.32 0.35 0.48  0.75 0.98 1.15 
C1.3 Makes informed decisions 3.07 3.82 3.04 0.44  0.22 0.35 0.38  0.46 0.77 1.55 
N4.1 Fears embarrassing himself/herself 3.18 3.61 3.46 0.42  0.23 0.43 0.55  0.65 1.14 1.18 
A4.2 Avoids sarcasm 3.25 3.89 3.25 0.42  0.33 0.54 0.52  0.73 1.13 1.25 
A4.5 Is forgiving 3.36 4 3.25 0.41  0.26 0.37 0.44  0.67 1.06 1.32 
A3.2 Is considerate to others 3.32 3.89 3 0.4  0.25 0.27 0.45  0.61 0.83 1.8 
E4.1 Has an energetic life-style 3 3.29 3.54 0.38  0.37 0.43 0.54  0.58 1.09 1.06 
A4.3 Avoids expressing anger 3.11 3.96 2.92 0.37  0.2 0.44 0.48  0.46 1.18 1.11 
O6.6 Is tolerant of different life-styles 3.36 3.96 2.92 0.37  0.24 0.3 0.55  0.53 0.82 1.96 
E6.7 Uses extremely positive words to describe 
things 
2.75 3 3.5 0.36  0.24 0.39 0.41  0.46 1.17 0.69 
O6.5 Values sticking with principles rather than 
being flexible-minded 
3.14 3.39 3.38 0.34  0.23 0.4 0.49  0.56 1 1.06 
E2.6 Likes vacations with crowds 3.25 3.43 3.63 0.34  0.47 0.52 0.5  0.82 1.29 0.69 
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E5.4 Likes distressing films 2.86 3.18 3.42 0.33  0.49 0.54 0.65  0.78 1.4 0.73 
A5.6 Feels he/she is not superior than anyone 3.04 3.68 2.79 0.32  0.2 0.36 0.46  0.52 1.06 1.33 
A2.7 Doesn't bully or flatter to get his/her way 3.11 3.5 3 0.32  0.24 0.41 0.48  0.7 1.05 1.56 
A1.8 Believes that human nature is good 2.89 3.5 2.88 0.32  0.25 0.41 0.61  0.67 0.84 1.37 
A5.1 Avoids boasting 3.29 3.46 3.21 0.31  0.28 0.45 0.49  0.63 1.08 1.43 
O1.6 Doesn't avoid daydreaming 2.82 2.82 3.42 0.3  0.29 0.36 0  0.59 0.96 0.92 
N6.1 Needs a lot of help 2.89 3.43 2.96 0.29  0.31 0.33 0.53  0.64 1.03 1.68 
C6.1 Has avoided being reckless 2.93 3 3.33 0.29  0.3 0.45 0.57  0.75 1.14 0.95 
A1.4 Believes most people can be trusted 3.18 3.43 3.21 0.29  0.23 0.24 0.56  0.66 0.82 1.38 
O2.1 Values aesthetics 2.93 3.21 3.08 0.28  0.45 0.43 0.66  0.71 1.21 1.17 
C5.1 Is good at time-management 3.36 3.46 3.17 0.28  0.34 0.47 0.59  0.69 1.07 1.83 
E3.4 Does the talking in meetings 3.54 3.54 3.38 0.26  0.4 0.51 0.63  0.76 1.11 0.89 
A6.6 Believes everyone must be treated 
respectfully 
3.36 3.75 2.83 0.26  0.23 0.38 0.46  0.59 0.88 2.12 
A3.7 Considers himself/herself bighearted 3.14 3.82 2.54 0.26  0.22 0.31 0.53  0.73 0.81 1.42 
N5.1 Has too much of a good thing 3 3.18 3.04 0.25  0.22 0.35 0.49  0.51 1.05 0.85 
C3.8 Shows up for work in almost any 
circumstances 
3.46 3.21 3.38 0.25  0.4 0.39 0.54  0.76 1.11 1.5 
E6.1 Is joyful 3.11 3.11 3.21 0.24  0.32 0.45 0.61  0.74 1.18 1.24 
N4.3 Has sometimes felt unbearably ashamed 3.11 3.36 2.96 0.24  0.22 0.42 0.64  0.68 1.2 0.95 
N3.4 Has sometimes felt very guilty and 2.96 3.36 2.96 0.24  0.32 0.39 0.54  0.64 1.15 1.12 
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disgraceful 
C3.6 Sticks with his/her ethical principles no 
matter what 
3.5 3.79 2.79 0.23  0.23 0.3 0.53  0.54 0.87 1.18 
E4.6 Is usually in a rush 2.82 3.21 2.88 0.23  0.32 0.43 0.54  0.62 1.06 1 
C2.1 Prefers to have a detailed plan 3.36 3.29 3.25 0.22  0.4 0.32 0.44  0.6 1.09 0.9 
N3.2 Feels useless 2.96 3.32 2.75 0.22  0.32 0.43 0.58  0.8 1.22 1.55 
O5.2 Finds philosophy interesting 2.89 2.93 3.08 0.2  0.43 0.5 0.65  0.74 1.26 0.92 
A5.4 Tries to be meek 3.18 3.64 2.63 0.2  0.23 0.42 0.6  0.58 0.9 1.34 
C5.7 Completes even the smallest of tasks 3.21 3 3.21 0.2  0.25 0.38 0.5  0.57 1.08 1.18 
A2.6 Avoids tricking people into things 3.21 3.36 2.79 0.18  0.28 0.41 0.53  0.74 1.06 1.39 
N4.7 Finds it very hard to face the person he/she 
has somehow offended 
3.18 3.32 2.96 0.18  0.17 0.3 0.51  0.62 1.01 1.01 
A2.2 Doesn't manipulate others 3.21 3.29 2.92 0.17  0.28 0.46 0.55  0.64 1.12 1.79 
N3.6 Has low self-esteem 3.11 3.39 2.67 0.17  0.32 0.42 0.59  0.75 1.04 1.64 
O4.6 Likes redecorating 3.11 3.07 3.33 0.17  0.31 0.48 0.6  0.71 1.13 1.02 
A3.1 Is seen as selfless 3.29 3.46 2.88 0.16  0.27 0.38 0.5  0.7 1.1 1.59 
N2.5 Is often sickened by others 3.11 3.25 2.92 0.16  0.26 0.34 0.52  0.62 0.96 1.43 
A2.8 Doesn't like to scheme with people 3.04 3.14 2.88 0.16  0.29 0.41 0.56  0.72 0.92 1.42 
E3.2 Manages to assert himself/herself 3.64 3.43 3.25 0.15  0.26 0.47 0.49  0.64 1.02 1.19 
C3.2 Is dependable 3.07 3.11 2.92 0.15  0.25 0.39 0.51  0.66 1.16 1.33 
A5.2 Avoids talking about his/her qualities 3.21 3.07 2.96 0.15  0.27 0.39 0.51  0.57 1.04 0.86 
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N6.7 Has poor judgement in difficult situations 3.36 3.21 3.13 0.15  0.21 0.28 0.4  0.58 0.77 1.62 
O5.8 Has curiosity about many things 3.54 3.39 3 0.15  0.35 0.45 0.56  0.71 1 1.31 
O1.2 Lets imagination fly 3.46 3.21 3.17 0.14  0.3 0.4 0.63  0.63 1.1 0.98 
A2.5 Wants to be seen true to his/her beliefs 3.57 3.32 3.04 0.14  0.13 0.19 0  0.63 0.82 1.58 
A4.8 Is rarely part of squabbles 3.18 3.25 2.79 0.14  0.31 0.34 0.52  0.63 0.98 1.31 
A5.3 Doesn't see themselves as better than 
others 
3.25 3.29 2.83 0.13  0.21 0.44 0.59  0.71 1.03 1.65 
N1.5 Is concerned about future 3.11 3.21 2.79 0.13  0.31 0.32 0  0.54 1.08 1.01 
O4.2 Is interested in new hobbies 3.21 3.25 2.79 0.12  0.36 0.31 0.53  0.53 0.86 1.53 
A5.5 Doesn't have a high self-opinion 3.14 3.54 2.33 0.12  0.31 0.45 0.57  0.73 1.01 1.41 
A1.7 Assumes people are good 3.29 3.46 2.58 0.12  0.24 0.29 0.48  0.73 0.85 1.26 
C1.7 Considers himself/herself able 3.5 3.43 2.83 0.12  0.24 0.37 0.53  0.63 0.8 1.39 
A5.8 Doesn't consider others inferior 2.82 3 2.54 0.12  0.28 0.46 0.63  0.74 1 1.46 
C5.2 Starts to work right away 3.25 3.32 2.83 0.11  0.37 0.45 0.66  0.74 1.17 1.44 
O5.6 Is interested in deep questions 2.93 2.89 2.83 0.09  0.32 0.41 0.57  0.57 1.18 0.95 
O2.7 Can be very aroused by poetry or art 3.14 3 2.96 0.09  0.4 0.51 0.66  0.82 1.19 0.87 
A5.7 Prefers to recognize others' achievements 
rather than his/her own 
3.25 3.25 2.54 0.09  0.24 0.42 0.53  0.63 0.94 1.26 
C4.8 Works excessively 3.5 3.46 2.58 0.09  0.42 0.49 0.56  0.75 1.13 1.24 
C3.1 Handles tasks diligently 3.61 3.46 2.92 0.08  0.26 0.32 0.48  0.51 0.79 2.03 
N4.2 Feels sheepish around people 3.29 3.29 2.67 0.08  0.31 0.4 0.54  0.58 1.08 1.19 
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A3.5 Is generous 3.25 3.25 2.58 0.08  0.19 0.34 0.61  0.55 0.93 1.16 
C5.6 Carries on even when faces challenges 3.43 3.11 3.08 0.08  0.22 0.32 0.49  0.54 0.98 1.28 
N2.7 Is sometimes spiteful and acrimonious 3.07 3.14 2.71 0.08  0.27 0.37 0.52  0.63 1.03 1.04 
C3.7 Works carefully to avoid having to do it 
again 
3.71 3.14 3.17 0.08  0.25 0.33 0.41  0.55 0.79 1.72 
O5.4 Enjoys theoretical conversations 3.11 2.71 3.04 0.07  0.35 0.49 0.59  0.72 1.12 0.73 
O2.8 Likes emotional and figurative poetry 3.11 2.54 3.25 0.07  0.35 0.4 0.58  0.68 1.09 0.67 
N3.8 Gets easily disheartened and gives up 3.25 3.29 2.92 0.07  0.29 0.33 0.51  0.58 1.01 1.47 
N4.8 Feels embarrassment for others 3.36 2.96 3.17 0.07  0.31 0.32 0.54  0.52 1.03 0.81 
O1.4 Daydreams 3.25 3.18 2.67 0.06  0.26 0.43 0.53  0.6 1.09 0.89 
O2.5 Is touched by poetry 3.21 2.68 3.13 0.06  0.45 0.53 0.65  0.72 1.26 0.81 
N3.5 Blames his/herself 3.36 3.54 2.38 0.06  0.25 0.41 0.42  0.64 1.04 0.94 
O4.7 Vacations in different places 3.54 2.93 3.17 0.06  0.38 0.45 0.49  0.71 1.08 0.74 
E3.5 Is expected to take lead 3.54 3.29 2.71 0.05  0.33 0.47 0.46  0.62 0.94 0.85 
O2.6 Finds music fascinating 3.68 3.04 3.08 0.05  0.38 0.43 0.65  0.78 1.07 1.03 
N5.6 Eats excessively 2.79 2.79 2.5 0.05  0.37 0.43 0.67  0.72 1.19 1.37 
N6.6 Is unable to self-manage in a crisis 3.5 3.54 2.58 0.05  0.23 0.32 0.47  0.62 0.83 1.68 
C4.2 Works towards one's goals 3.68 3.43 2.67 0.04  0.31 0.38 0.54  0.6 1.01 1.64 
C1.5 Is convinced to have a good judgement 3.25 3.11 2.5 0.04  0.26 0.37 0.46  0.58 0.85 1.2 
C2.8 Doesn't misplace things 2.93 2.54 2.96 0.04  0.39 0.45 0.53  0.68 1.12 1.19 
A1.2 Believes people have mostly good 3.32 3.07 2.71 0.03  0.23 0.23 0.43  0.77 0.86 1.45 
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intentions 
A4.4 Doesn't show when dislikes someone 3.36 3.39 2.46 0.03  0.3 0.36 0.51  0.75 1.05 1.13 
C6.8 Thinks through his/her answers 3.82 3.46 2.75 0.02  0.2 0.34 0.41  0.49 0.96 1.24 
O3.6 Is emotionally sensitive to environments 3.25 3.07 2.79 0.01  0.22 0.32 0.58  0.55 0.93 1.03 
O3.4 Monitors his/her feelings 2.96 2.89 2.5 -0.01  0.27 0.28 0.46  0.61 0.97 1.04 
N4.4 Feels very embarrassed when teased or 
made fun of 
3.57 3.32 2.5 -0.02  0.25 0.43 0.53  0.61 1.15 1.13 
C5.3 Always finishes the job 3.61 3.54 2.25 -0.03  0.3 0.45 0.54  0.68 0.83 1.54 
N4.5 Thinks others are better than him/her 3.18 3 2.33 -0.03  0.33 0.44 0.58  0.68 1.09 1.28 
N3.7 Feels downhearted and futile 3.21 3.14 2.54 -0.03  0.35 0.4 0.58  0.72 1.13 1.18 
N6.2 Feels unable to cope 3.5 3.25 2.38 -0.04  0.25 0.22 0.44  0.55 0.84 1.74 
O4.3 Doesn't stick with only one way of doing 
things 
3.68 3.25 2.67 -0.05  0.21 0.25 0.49  0.46 0.9 1.02 
A6.7 Feels for the poor 3.79 3.57 2.29 -0.05  0.22 0.34 0.58  0.5 0.82 1.4 
C2.2 Keeps possessions tidy 3.61 3.32 2.38 -0.06  0.45 0.51 0.64  0.76 1.09 1.62 
A3.3 Is perceived as warm and uncalculating 3.07 3.04 2.13 -0.06  0.26 0.31 0.57  0.68 1.01 1.4 
E4.3 Works quickly 3.64 2.96 2.79 -0.06  0.31 0.43 0.53  0.55 1.05 0.81 
N6.3 Feels breaking down under stress 3.57 3.04 2.88 -0.06  0.28 0.4 0.58  0.68 1.17 1.25 
A1.6 Defaults to trusting others 3.29 2.86 2.54 -0.06  0.26 0.43 0.57  0.78 0.94 1.14 
E1.8 Cares for colleagues 3.71 2.93 3 -0.06  0.22 0.28 0.45  0.67 0.84 1.44 
C1.8 Works efficiently 3.5 3.21 2.25 -0.06  0.24 0.36 0.54  0.66 0.79 1.7 
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E3.3 Emerges as leader 3.71 3.18 2.75 -0.07  0.44 0.53 0.66  0.74 1.16 1.05 
C4.3 Gives up on self-improvements  3.36 2.71 2.75 -0.07  0.32 0.35 0.54  0.6 1.07 1.36 
E5.8 Likes attending games 3.64 2.68 3.25 -0.07  0.5 0.51 0.62  0.78 1.18 0.92 
C1.1 Is reasonable and practical 3.57 3.21 2.29 -0.08  0.3 0.38 0.54  0.63 0.91 1.65 
C2.4 Puts things back where they belong 3.57 3.11 2.46 -0.08  0.39 0.36 0.47  0.63 1.06 1.21 
N2.1 Is often riled by others 3.43 2.68 2.83 -0.09  0.31 0.39 0.58  0.62 1.09 1.16 
A3.4 Tries to be respectful of others 3.61 3.39 2.25 -0.09  0.22 0.27 0  0.43 0.76 1.71 
A3.6 Is generally liked 3.32 2.89 2.46 -0.09  0.22 0.27 0.48  0.6 0.68 1.6 
N1.7 Has many fears 3.21 2.86 2.38 -0.09  0.28 0.44 0.5  0.63 0.94 0.87 
A4.1 Prefers working together over rivalry 3.86 3.04 3 -0.1  0.24 0.36 0.36  0.59 0.92 1.67 
A2.3 Could not deceive others 3.18 2.71 2.46 -0.1  0.25 0.44 0.5  0.66 1.13 1.49 
C1.4 Comes prepared 3.57 2.86 2.75 -0.1  0.22 0.35 0.6  0.5 0.95 0.93 
C5.5 Finishes what has been started 3.82 3.14 2.67 -0.1  0.26 0.35 0.53  0.61 0.87 1.68 
O3.1 Values strong emotions 3.29 2.61 2.71 -0.11  0.25 0.31 0.49  0.62 1.04 0.98 
O1.3 Has an active fantasy 3.61 3 2.46 -0.11  0.31 0.47 0.55  0.72 1.09 1.03 
E3.6 Feels comfortable being a leader 3.71 3.25 2.5 -0.11  0.33 0.47 0.51  0.62 1.06 0.85 
E1.1 Likes almost everyone 3.29 3 2.29 -0.12  0.29 0.33 0.53  0.65 0.84 1.65 
A4.6 Finds it hard to fight back 3.5 2.96 2.5 -0.12  0.27 0.46 0.56  0.74 1.11 1.24 
E2.7 Enjoys social events 3.43 2.93 2.58 -0.12  0.37 0.43 0.58  0.68 0.96 1.19 
N1.1 Worries a lot 3.5 3 2.46 -0.13  0.3 0.31 0.43  0.52 1.2 1.1 
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E1.4 Is seen as approachable 3.25 2.89 2.38 -0.13  0.29 0.44 0.54  0.74 1.01 1.35 
N5.4 Overeats favorite foods 3.29 2.57 2.67 -0.13  0.36 0.48 0.6  0.68 1.08 0.88 
C3.5 Follows through on commitments 3.93 3.11 2.63 -0.13  0.27 0.26 0.52  0.6 0.83 2.18 
E6.5 Is merry 3.43 2.79 2.63 -0.13  0.4 0.41 0.53  0.48 1.04 1.21 
C2.7 Cleans excessively 3.25 2.79 2.42 -0.13  0.41 0.45 0.5  0.61 1.15 0.82 
A3.8 Does anything to help 3.75 3.32 2.42 -0.13  0.24 0.37 0.48  0.55 0.73 1.52 
N6.4 Gets dismayed in difficult situations 3.93 3.5 2.25 -0.14  0.27 0.41 0.48  0.68 0.93 1.84 
C4.5 Wants to get ahead 3.36 2.79 2.46 -0.14  0.3 0.46 0.43  0.55 1.12 1.24 
N3.1 Feels left behind 3.29 2.79 2.29 -0.16  0.27 0.26 0.52  0.67 1.17 1.34 
N5.8 Cannot keep calm 3.46 3.14 2.17 -0.16  0.29 0.35 0.42  0.59 1.04 1.18 
A2.1 Is honest 3.25 2.64 2.38 -0.17  0.15 0.3 0.44  0.53 1.1 1.31 
N5.3 Finds it hard to resist temptations 3.29 2.82 2.13 -0.17  0.27 0.24 0.39  0.4 1.05 1.18 
N1.4 Is often fidgety 3.32 2.89 2.33 -0.17  0.35 0.39 0.56  0.74 1.07 1.32 
O1.7 Liked pretend play as a kid 3.18 2.5 2.63 -0.17  0.23 0.42 0.58  0.53 0.99 0.81 
E5.7 Likes showy styles 3.04 2.57 2.25 -0.17  0.46 0.37 0.52  0.64 1.08 0.66 
C6.7 Plans before travel 4.04 2.79 3.04 -0.17  0.37 0.41 0.57  0.58 1.1 0.96 
N1.8 Has scary thoughts 3.39 2.75 2.54 -0.18  0.26 0.44 0.56  0.64 1.13 0.98 
C4.7 Always strives for the best 4.14 3.25 2.63 -0.19  0.31 0.43 0.56  0.6 1.01 1.19 
E3.8 Finds it easy to take lead 3.61 2.79 2.63 -0.19  0.35 0.42 0.48  0.56 1.04 0.98 
C4.1 Is enthusiastic 3.32 2.82 2.17 -0.2  0.32 0.34 0.49  0.53 0.98 1.51 
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E1.6 Can easily approach strangers 3.5 3.14 1.96 -0.21  0.35 0.39 0.56  0.65 1.05 1.66 
C6.6 Avoids hurried decisions 3.46 2.79 2.38 -0.21  0.23 0.33 0.43  0.54 0.95 1.24 
E2.8 Likes crowded parties 3.89 2.86 2.79 -0.21  0.5 0.56 0.61  0.82 1.17 0.96 
C5.8 Is very disciplined 3.68 3.11 2.08 -0.21  0.33 0.48 0.53  0.62 0.96 1.45 
O1.5 Enjoys letting fantasies develop 3.57 2.79 2.29 -0.22  0.28 0.41 0.58  0.75 1.13 1.04 
E3.7 Is the most talkative person in 
conversations 
3.68 2.71 2.5 -0.22  0.43 0.44 0.56  0.71 1.05 0.97 
C4.6 Is ambitious in everything 3.96 3.04 2.42 -0.23  0.29 0.43 0.53  0.65 0.98 1.51 
O4.8 Is happy to try new routes 3.71 2.86 2.42 -0.23  0.26 0.38 0.48  0.55 1.03 0.75 
E6.3 Sees the bright side 3.46 2.96 2.17 -0.24  0.31 0.46 0.5  0.68 1.1 1.55 
E5.3 Does things just for a "kick" 3.54 2.68 2.42 -0.25  0.41 0.48 0.59  0.64 1.14 0.89 
C4.4 Works hard towards his/her goals 3.96 3.18 2.08 -0.25  0.33 0.33 0.59  0.64 0.93 1.77 
C6.4 Heeds consequences before doing 
something 
3.82 3.04 2.29 -0.25  0.23 0.34 0.55  0.66 1 1.51 
E5.6 Likes roller coasters 3.68 2.29 2.88 -0.26  0.45 0.63 0.62  0.87 1.42 0.81 
E3.1 Is commanding 3.75 3.14 2 -0.27  0.42 0.49 0.49  0.68 1.15 1.23 
O4.5 Is happy to change environment 3.96 2.86 2.67 -0.27  0.27 0.4 0.53  0.55 1.03 0.69 
C2.6 Is somewhat pedantic and captious 3.46 2.5 2.38 -0.27  0.28 0.43 0.45  0.61 1.04 1.11 
O2.2 Is entranced by music 3.68 2.32 2.75 -0.28  0.4 0.5 0.67  0.8 1.15 1.32 
E1.3 Is friendly 3.68 3.11 1.75 -0.28  0.27 0.47 0.5  0.76 0.8 1.76 
E2.5 Likes jobs that require working with others 3.86 2.86 2.46 -0.28  0.3 0.44 0.53  0.65 1.1 0.79 
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N5.5 Gives in to impulses 3.75 2.82 2.25 -0.29  0.21 0.34 0.41  0.53 0.97 0.98 
O5.5 Enjoys puzzles 3.61 2.29 2.75 -0.29  0.37 0.51 0.6  0.74 1.17 0.96 
E1.2 Enjoys gabbing 3.39 2.5 2.13 -0.3  0.33 0.3 0.53  0.71 0.96 1.73 
C2.5 Is well organized 3.32 2.39 2.21 -0.31  0.29 0.46 0.52  0.7 0.97 1.55 
O3.8 Has emotions provoked by a variety of 
things 
3.43 2.54 2.38 -0.31  0.31 0.43 0.57  0.59 1.1 0.87 
E4.8 Is always on the go 3.61 2.68 2.08 -0.31  0.42 0.45 0.61  0.81 0.99 1.33 
N3.3 Is often sad 3.61 2.61 2.25 -0.33  0.28 0.42 0.5  0.71 1.12 1.3 
N2.4 Is seen as a precarious person 3.57 2.75 2.13 -0.33  0.24 0.26 0.4  0.38 1.01 1.2 
O5.7 Desires to understand things 3.75 2.79 2.04 -0.34  0.36 0.49 0.53  0.7 0.9 1.51 
O5.1 Enjoys thinking theoretically 3.82 2.64 2.33 -0.35  0.32 0.54 0.57  0.73 1.17 0.99 
E2.2 Likes to be surrounded by people 3.68 2.54 2.38 -0.35  0.43 0.53 0.62  0.74 1.09 1.26 
N1.3 Feels anxiety 3.64 2.93 1.83 -0.35  0.32 0.46 0.54  0.71 1.09 1.08 
E2.1 Feels comfortable in crowds 3.68 2.61 2.21 -0.36  0.4 0.44 0.59  0.71 1.24 0.98 
C2.3 Is meticulous 3.54 2.57 2 -0.36  0.29 0.48 0.54  0.58 1.04 1.07 
O1.8 Can let mind wander 3.68 2.39 2.42 -0.36  0.16 0.32 0.42  0.36 1 0.7 
O2.4 Is interested in patterns 3.93 2.68 2.29 -0.37  0.44 0.44 0.6  0.75 1.1 1.13 
E4.5 Is no less energetic than others 3.18 2.43 1.88 -0.37  0.34 0.37 0.56  0.66 1.06 0.82 
E2.3 Prefers company 3.89 3.18 1.79 -0.38  0.36 0.46 0.54  0.64 1.1 0.98 
N2.6 Is easy to infuriate 3.96 2.79 2.21 -0.38  0.35 0.45 0.51  0.7 1.08 1.41 
C5.4 Can make him/herself do what needs doing 3.71 2.46 2.21 -0.39  0.28 0.42 0.54  0.62 1.08 1.3 
65 
                                                                                                                       Traits and Adaptations 
A6.2 Is not hard-nosed 3.86 2.96 1.83 -0.4  0.29 0.36 0.54  0.57 1.03 1.25 
C6.2 Avoids hasty decisions 4.07 3.11 1.92 -0.4  0.27 0.35 0.53  0.45 0.88 1.55 
N1.2 Is easily frightened 3.57 2.96 1.54 -0.41  0.35 0.43 0.6  0.74 1.13 1.05 
E6.2 Is sometimes overwhelmed by joy 3.79 2.68 2.13 -0.41  0.3 0.38 0.2  0.59 0.86 1.58 
E2.4 Starts longing for company when alone 3.68 2.64 2.04 -0.41  0.3 0.41 0.5  0.48 1.06 1.34 
E1.7 Is emotionally attached to friends 4.11 2.93 2.33 -0.41  0.32 0.41 0.54  0.73 0.91 1.52 
O4.1 Can easily change habits 3.5 2.5 2 -0.42  0.23 0.45 0.57  0.6 1.03 1.07 
O3.3 Minds his/her feelings 3.96 2.79 2.17 -0.42  0.23 0.29 0.48  0.42 0.79 0.98 
N2.8 Is easy to frustrate 3.71 2.57 2.04 -0.43  0.27 0.4 0.57  0.59 1.07 1.4 
N6.8 Is emotionally unstable 3.82 2.61 2 -0.43  0.34 0.32 0.34  0.78 0.95 1.56 
E4.2 Acts strenuously 3.93 2.71 2 -0.44  0.33 0.39 0.48  0.57 0.82 1.6 
N5.2 Cannot resist cravings 3.79 2.68 1.96 -0.44  0.24 0.44 0.55  0.68 1.08 1.06 
N6.5 Finds it hard to decide 3.57 2.36 2.08 -0.44  0.31 0.42 0.54  0.7 1.11 1.07 
N2.3 Is short-tempered 3.61 2.82 1.63 -0.45  0.4 0.46 0.58  0.7 1.14 1.56 
O5.3 Likes mental challenges 4 2.89 1.92 -0.45  0.35 0.44 0.61  0.62 1.09 1.18 
N5.7 Does things offhand and later regrets 3.86 2.61 2.21 -0.45  0.22 0.37 0.47  0.66 1.01 0.98 
C6.3 Sometimes acts without thinking 3.54 2.36 2.04 -0.46  0.24 0.4 0.41  0.66 1.09 1.11 
E6.4 Is sometimes extremely happy 3.57 2.43 2.08 -0.46  0.32 0.51 0.5  0.74 0.91 1.61 
N1.6 Keeps thinking of what might go astray 4.04 2.79 1.96 -0.46  0.32 0.39 0.56  0.72 1.08 0.98 
O3.2 Experiences strong feelings 4 2.57 2.25 -0.49  0.27 0.4 0.49  0.59 1.04 1.09 
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C6.5 Acts impromptu 3.79 2.46 2.04 -0.49  0.3 0.44 0.52  0.69 1.01 0.93 
N2.2 Is agitated 3.82 2.71 1.63 -0.51  0.32 0.45 0.45  0.65 1 1.51 
O3.7 Can easily feel other's emotions 3.89 2.68 1.83 -0.51  0.22 0.4 0  0.59 0.88 1.53 
E5.1 Craves for excitement 4.04 2.36 2.21 -0.52  0.34 0.43 0.59  0.69 1.09 0.81 
E6.6 Is exuberant 3.86 2.5 1.92 -0.52  0.37 0.56 0.58  0.78 0.93 1.75 
E5.5 Wants action 4 2.75 1.88 -0.53  0.4 0.44 0.57  0.7 1.05 1.04 
E6.8 Is easy to make laugh 3.93 2.46 2.08 -0.54  0.34 0.42 0.45  0.71 0.91 1.52 
O1.1 Has bustling imagination 4 2.68 1.54 -0.6  0.31 0.4 0.55  0.75 1.05 1.23 
E1.5 Loves talking to people 4.11 2.5 1.75 -0.64  0.39 0.41 0.58  0.8 0.91 1.72 
E4.4 Is full of energy 3.68 1.89 1.83 -0.66  0.34 0.41 0.6  0.76 1.01 1.32 
A4.7 Is persistent and unyielding 4.04 2.43 1.5 -0.72  0.31 0.45 0.49  0.75 1.13 1.3 
O3.5 Has many emotions 4.18 1.82 1.63 -0.88  0.22 0.42 0.47  0.58 0.89 1.19 
Note. Code refers to an item’s notation in the NEO-PI-R and are interpretable as Big Five domain (N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, 
O = Openness to Experience, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness), facet (1-6 for each domain), and item (1-8 for each facet), 
respectively.  Tc, Ac, V, and AO refer to rating conditions Combined Trait, Combined Adaptation, Bipolar, and Overall Adaptation-
ness. AO scores are the result of averaging across means of standardized item scores within the original 5 rating conditions. rCA = 
cross-rater agreement. rRO = rank-order stability. h
2 = heritability. rTT = 7-10-day re-test reliability. Var = item standard deviations. 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics and Spearman’s correlations for all variables. 
Variable M SD Agreement Stability Heritability Variance Evaluativeness Re-test 
Agreement .30 .07       
Stability .40 .07 .61***      
Heritability .52 .10 .49*** .51***     
Variance 1.03 .13 .52*** .54*** .43***    
Evaluativeness 1.25 .31 -.21** -.27*** -.19* -.48***   
Re-test Reliability .64 .09 .57*** .56*** .49*** .38*** .01  
Trait 3.38 .40 0.11 0.11 -0.06 -0.18** 0.10 0.01 
Adaptation 3.09 .44 -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.11 -0.19** 0.27*** -0.12 
Bipolar 2.68 .57 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 0.15* -0.16* -0.04 
Adaptation (Overall) 0 .35 -0.20** -0.17** -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.06 
Note. M = mean. SD = standard deviation. “Trait,” “Adaptation,” “Bipolar,” and “Adaptation (Overall)” refer to Tc Ac, V, 
and AO ratings. “Variance” = item standard deviations. “Re-test” = 7-10-day re-test reliability. Intercorrelations among BT-
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